To what extent do the justices on the Supreme Court behave strategically? In Strategy on the United States Supreme Court, Saul Brenner and Joseph M. Whitmeyer investigate the answers to this question and reveal that justices are substantially less strategic than many Supreme Court scholars believe. By examining the research to date on each of the justice's important activities, Brenner and Whitmeyer's work shows that the justices often do not cast their certiorari votes in accord with the outcome-prediction strategy, that the other members of the conference coalition bargain successfully with the majority opinion writer in less than 6 percent of the situations, and that most of the fluidity in voting on the Court is nonstrategic. This work is essential to understanding how strategic behavior -or its absence -influences the decisions of the Supreme Court and, as a result, American politics and society.
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Printed in the United States of America an outcome-prediction strategy; in other words, they vote to grant cert when they expect to win at the final vote on the merits and vote to deny cert when they expect to lose. In Chapter 5, we examine the prior literature, present some new findings, and conclude that there is much less support for this model than many strategic scholars believe.
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We have attempted to write a book that can be understood by students who may lack a good methodological background but who are willing to make the effort of following a theoretical argument.
Although we have learned a great deal from many of the sources listed in the reference section, this book is particularly dependent on the prior research and theoretical discussion of 
